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 The starting point for this Article was the twenty-fifth 
anniversary of the establishment of the University of Miami 
International and Comparative Law Review (“ICLR”), which 
broadly coincided with my first visit to Miami in February 
1992 to give a job talk, the subject of which was the 
European project to create a single internal market.2 The first 
course I taught at the University of Miami was a course on 
the law of the European Economic Community. Many UM 
                                                
	
	
1 Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law, P.O. Box 248087, 
Coral Gables, Florida, 33124, cbradley@law.miami.edu; 
http://blenderlaw.umlaw.net/, ©Caroline Bradley 2017. All rights 
reserved. 
2 See generally Caroline Bradley, 1992: The Case of Financial Services, 12 
NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 124 (1991). 
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students in the JD and LLM programs were and are 
interested in international and comparative law courses. 
Since 1992, international law and the law of what is now the 
European Union have evolved, both in substance and in 
accessibility. In 1992, the Official Journal came to Miami in 
microfiche format but during the 1990s it moved online, 
making European public documents dramatically more 
accessible.3  
By the beginning of 1992, Europe was moving 
forward from the Single European Act towards Economic 
and Monetary Union via the signing of the Maastricht Treaty 
in December 1991.4 Between the signing of the Maastricht 
Treaty and the summer of 2016, Europe engaged in a general 
process of widening—expanding membership—and 
deepening—intensifying the links among members5—
although with the evolution of special arrangements for 
                                                
	
	
3 Cf. Deirdre M. Curtin, Citizens’ Fundamental Right of Access to EU 
Information: An Evolving Digital Passepartout?, 37 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 7, 
10 (2000) (“[T]he EU is moving towards a position of (greatly) facilitating 
such access to information via digital means and is putting some 
emphasis on the function of facilitation of democratic political 
participation by citizens in this manner.”). 
4 See, e.g., Michael J. Baun, The Maastricht Treaty as High Politics: Germany, 
France, and European Integration, 110 POL. SCI. Q. 605, 605 (1995).  
5See generally Neill Nugent, The Deepening and Widening of the European 
Community: Recent Evolution, Maastricht, and Beyond, 30 J. COMMON MKT. 
STUD. 311 (1992); Christina J. Schneider, Domestic Politics and the 
Widening–Deepening Trade-off in the European Union, 21 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 
699 (2014). 
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individual Member States in some areas.6 
 In June 2016, the United Kingdom held a referendum 
on the question of whether the UK should leave the 
European Union (“EU”), in which 51.9% of those who voted 
said they wished the UK to leave the EU.7 Implementing 
Brexit is a challenge for the UK Government and has 
implications for the future of an EU without the UK as a 
Member. But the UK Brexit decision is not the only stress the 
EU faces in 2017. The EU is still in the process of managing 
the sovereign debt crisis that followed the global financial 
crisis,8 and the ongoing refugee crisis strains relations 
among the EU Member States.9 In Jean-Claude Juncker, the 
                                                
	
	
6 See, e.g., REBECCA ADLER-NISSEN, OPTING OUT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
5 (2014) (noting that the UK and Denmark negotiated opt-outs with 
respect to Economic and Monetary Union). 
7 See EU Referendum Results, THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, (last visited 
Sept. 29, 2017), www.electoralcommission.org.uk/find-information-by-
subject/elections-and-referendums/past-elections-and-referendums/eu-
referendum/electorate-and-count-information.  
8 See IMF, Euro Area Policies: 2017 Article IV Consultation—Press Release; 
Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for Member Countries, 
COUNTRY REPORT NO. 17/235 (July 2017); see also Desmond Dinan, 
Governance and Institutions: Implementing the Lisbon Treaty in the Shadow of 
the Euro Crisis, 49 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 103, 103 (2011) 
(noting “[t]he word ‘crisis’ is much used and abused in the rhetoric of 
European integration”). 
9 See European Commission Press Release STATEMENT/17/1876, 
Migration: Joint Declaration by Commissioner Avramopoulos and the 
Ministers of Interior of France, Germany and Italy 1 (July 3, 2017), 
4 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 25 
President of the European Commission’s, State of the EU 
Address in 2016, he noted that the EU faced a number of 
ongoing crises: “From high unemployment and social 
inequality, to mountains of public debt, to the huge 
challenge of integrating refugees, to the very real threats to 
our security at home and abroad—every one of Europe’s 
Member States has been affected by the continuing crises of 
our times.”10 Also in September of 2016, Jacques Delors, 
President of the EU Commission from 1985 to 1995, argued 
that “[i]n this time of crisis for European identity, it is 
essential for the EU to show that it is not paralysed but 
ready to act as a leading force in the many challenges we 
face: the fight against climate change, increasing inequality, 
the need to ensure sustainable and inclusive development, 
promoting human rights and ensuring that nobody is left 
behind.”11 




(noting existing “challenges posed by the increasing migratory flow on 
the Central Mediterranean route”); see generally Massimo Bordignon & 
Simone Moriconi, The Case for a Common European Refugee Policy, 8 
BRUEGEL POL’Y CONTRIBUTION, 1,1 (2017).  
10 European Commission Press Release SPEECH/16/3043, State of the 
Union Address 2016: Towards a Better Europe – A Europe That Protects, 
Empowers and Defends (Sept. 14, 2016), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_SPEECH-16-3043_en.pdf. 
11 See Jacques Delors, Restoring a Europe Built on Values for its Youth, WWF, 
(Sept. 12, 2016), wwf.eu/?277870/Jacques-Delors-Restoring-a-Europe-
built-on-values-for-its-youth (publication coincides with Common 
Statement by 177 European and National Civil Society Organizations & 
2017 EUROPEAN (DIS)UNION 5 
 The contrast between 1992 and 2017 could not be 
starker. In 1992, the Cold War was at an end,12 European 
countries were moving forward with processes of widening 
and deepening European integration,13 and regulators were 
beginning to build transnational networks to address 
common problems.14 By the end of 2016 and, in particular, 
after the UK Brexit referendum and the US election, 
commentators struggled to understand a world in which 
crises and political reactions to those crises disrupted the 
international order.15 These weaknesses in the European 
components of the transnational order arguably relate back 
																																								 																																							 																																							 															
	
	
Trade Unions, A New Europe for People, Planet and Prosperity for All, WWF 
(Sept. 12, 2016), http://www.wwf.eu/?277851/A_new_Europe). 
12 See Symposium, The End of the Cold War and Theories of International 
Relations, 48 INT’L ORG. 155 (1994). 
13 Geoffrey Pridham, EU Enlargement and Consolidating Democracy in Post–
Communist States—Formality and Reality, 40 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 953 
(2002). 
14 See Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International 
Policy Coordination, 46 INT’L ORG. 1, 32–33 (1992); see also Ethan Barnaby 
Kapstein, Between Power and Purpose: Central Bankers and the Politics of 
Regulatory Convergence, 46 INT’L ORG. 265, 266 (1992) (“It was the threat of 
a bilateral agreement on capital regulation that would have been 
disadvantageous to banks based outside New York and London, two of 
the world’s most important financial centers, that moved the other G-10 
central bankers from mutual education and discussion of common 
aversions to collective action. Within two years, the bilateral agreement 
thus spread to the other G-10 countries.”). 
15 See, e.g., Robin Niblett, Liberalism in Retreat: The Demise of a Dream, 96 
FOREIGN AFF., Jan.–Feb. 2017, at 17.  
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to decisions made in the late 1980s and early 1990s,16 or even 
earlier. The UK has been an irritant in the European project 
since before the UK accession, and Euroscepticism in the UK 
has a long history.17 Although this article focuses on 
developments in the EU, the 2016 US election illustrates that 
similar disruptions are occurring on both sides of the 
                                                
	
	
16 See Matthias Matthijs, Europe After Brexit: A Less Perfect Union, 96 
FOREIGN AFF., Jan.–Feb. 2017, at 85, 86 (“The roots of the EU’s current 
crisis can be traced to the 1980s.”); Luigi Guiso et al., Monnet’s Error?, 31 
ECON. POL’Y 247, 250 (2016) (“This positive feedback loop, however, 
seems to break down with the 1992 Maastricht Treaty (and the 
simultaneous crisis in the European Monetary System). There is a drop 
in support for the European membership and by looking at individual 
data this drop is highly correlated with a reduced support for the single 
market and for further political integration. This step seems to have 
created a permanent backlash.”). 
17 See Oliver Daddow, Margaret Thatcher, Tony Blair and the Eurosceptic 
Tradition in Britain, 15 BRIT. J. POL. & INT’L REL. 210, 212–13 (2013) (“In 
this article the British Eurosceptic tradition will be interpreted as that 
tradition of thought about Britain’s national identity that sees Britain as 
being not only geographically separate from the continental landmass of 
Europe but, crucially, as psychologically distant from the European 
integration movement formalized in the Rome Treaty of 1957.”); Philip 
Lynch & Richard Whitaker, Where There is Discord, Can They Bring 
Harmony? Managing Intra-Party Dissent on European Integration in the 
Conservative Party, 15 BRIT. J. POL. & INT’L REL. 317, 321 (2013) (“The 
proportion of Eurosceptics in the parliamentary party has grown since 
1979, with each new intake more Eurosceptic than the last.”) (internal 
citation omitted). 
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Atlantic.18 
 The European project has been an important 
component of the post–World War II movement to promote 
peace through the development of transnational 
organizations and linkages.19 These organizations include 
the United Nations, established as the successor to the 
                                                
	
	
18 See Joseph Nye, Jr., Will the Liberal Order Survive?: The History of an Idea, 
96 FOREIGN AFF., Jan.–Feb. 2017, at 10, 14 (“The 2016 presidential election 
was marked by populist reactions to globalization and trade agreements 
in both major parties, and the liberal international order is a project of 
just the sort of cosmopolitan elites whom populists see as the enemy.”); 
id. at 15 (attempting to identify sources of the new populism movement 
and noting that “[d]iscontent and frustration are likely to continue, and 
the election of Trump and the British vote to leave the EU demonstrate 
that populist reactions are common to many Western democracies.”); but 
see Ruben Durante et al., The Political Legacy of Entertainment TV 4 (Ctr. 
for Econ. Performance, Discussion Paper No. 1475, 2017), 
cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp1475.pdf (“While popular discontent 
with the political establishment is likely to have deep socioeconomic 
roots, our findings suggest that by popularizing certain linguistic codes 
and cultural models, entertainment television may have contributed to 
creating a fertile ground for the success of populist leaders.”). 
19 See generally A. Loveday, The European Movement, 3 INT’L ORG. 620 
(1949) (examining several distinct post-war initiatives towards European 
union); cf. Jean Monnet, A Ferment of Change, 1 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 
203, 204 (1963) (“[T]he countries of continental Europe, which have 
fought each other so often in the past and which, even in peacetime, 
organized their economies as potential instruments of war, are now 
uniting in a Common Market which is laying the foundations for 
political union.”). 
8 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 25 
League of Nations;20 the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (“OECD”), which grew out 
of then-Secretary of State George C. Marshall’s plan to 
reconstruct Europe;21 and the Bretton Woods organizations: 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
(“IMF”).22 But the geopolitical context in which these 
institutions currently operate is very different from their 
original context.23 The Cold War, which began in the 
                                                
	
	
20 See generally Leland M. Goodrich, From League of Nations to United 
Nations, 1 INT’L ORG. 3 (1947). 
21 See generally Thomas C. Blaisdell Jr., The European Recovery Program—
Phase Two, 2 INT’L ORG. 443 (1948) (describing the European Recovery 
Program); Lincoln Gordon, The Organization for European Economic 
Cooperation, 10 INT’L ORG. 1, 2 (1956) (“From the very beginning of 
systematic Washington consideration of the administrative problems of 
the European Recovery Program, it was felt desirable that there be some 
form of European institution, both to provide a mechanism for 
organizing mutual aid among the beneficiary countries and to serve as a 
center where United States representatives could negotiate and consult 
on European-wide problems.”). 
22 See generally Charles P. Kindleberger, Bretton Woods Reappraised, 5 INT’L 
ORG. 32 (1951); Klaus Knorr, The Bretton Woods Institutions in Transition, 2 
INT’L ORG. 19 (1948). 
23 See generally Meeting of the OECD Council at Ministerial Level, Final 
NAEC Synthesis: New Approaches to Economic Challenges (Paris, June 3–4, 
2015), http://www.oecd.org/mcm/documents/Final-NAEC-Synthesis-
Report-CMIN2015-2.pdf (“NAEC recognises the increased international 
economic integration and resulting complexity, and the insights that may 
be gained by analysing the global economy as a complex adaptive 
system. This will help to take into account uncertainty, spill-overs, 
2017 EUROPEAN (DIS)UNION 9 
aftermath of World War II, ended with the fall of the Berlin 
Wall in 1989, just before ICLR was established (and 
presumably part of the dramatic changes Victor Marroquín-
Merino, the first Editor-in-Chief of ICLR, had in mind in 
1991).24  
 More recently, there have been further geopolitical 
shifts with developments in the Middle East, with the new 
visibility of China on the world stage, and with a transfer of 
some power from governments to non-governmental 
entities.25 Increasingly, policy-makers are conscious of a 
large number of new risks to the international system and to 
individual states: risks of terrorism, financial risks that 
spread across borders, and climate change, involving 
disruptive weather events, rising sea levels, and threats of 
food insecurity.26 National anxiety in the face of these risks is 
part of what has caused developments like the UK Brexit 
																																								 																																							 																																							 															
	
	
systemic risks and network effects. This analysis, amongst others, will 
help policymakers get a better grip on rising global interconnectedness.”)  
24 See Victor Marroquín-Merino, Foreword, 1 U. MIAMI Y.B. INT’L L. (1991) 
(noting then-recent dramatic changes in international law). 
25 See Nye, supra note 18, at 13–14. 
26 See IMF, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: POTENT POLICIES FOR A 
SUCCESSFUL NORMALIZATION 2 (Apr. 2016) (“Increased political 
uncertainty related to geopolitical conflicts, political discord, terrorism, 
refugee flows, or global epidemics loom over some countries and 
regions, and if left unchecked, could have significant spillovers on 
financial markets.”). 
10 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 25 
vote;27 appeals to nationalism and populism are designed to 
counter supranational co-operation. But the idea that 
globalization, and the development of the EU, have harmed 
national interests is controversial: for example, Alan 
Milward has argued that the European project has 
strengthened, rather than weakened, nation states.28 
 
II. BEFORE 1992: CREATION, WIDENING, DEEPENING  
 
 In the aftermath of World War II, Europeans were 
imagining the development of closer relationships among 
European states in various fora.29 In 1950, Robert Schuman, 
then-Foreign Minister of France, set out a specific proposal, 
                                                
	
	
27 See WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, THE GLOBAL RISKS REPORT 2017, 9 (12th 
ed. Jan. 11, 2017), www3.weforum.org/docs/GRR17_Report_web.pdf 
(“This 12th edition of The Global Risks Report is published at a time of 
heightened political uncertainty, following a year of unexpected electoral 
results, particularly in the United States and the United Kingdom. 
Polarized societies and political landscapes are taking centre stage in 
many countries, with deepening generational and cultural divisions 
amplifying the risks associated with sluggish economic recovery and 
accelerating technological change.”). 
28 See ALAN S. MILWARD, THE EUROPEAN RESCUE OF THE NATION STATE 
(1992); see also Andrew Moravcsik, The European Constitutional Settlement, 
31 WORLD ECON. 158, 161 (2008) (“The interests of European 
governments consistently converged across a wide range of issues in 
response to a 50-year regional boom in intra-industry trade and 
investment, which made Europe by far the most interdependent region 
in the world.”). 
29 See Loveday, supra note 19. 
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arguing that “Europe will not be made all at once, or 
according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete 
achievements which first create a de facto solidarity.”30 
Schuman proposed a pooling of coal and steel production 
between France and Germany (that other countries could 
join) and argued that “[t]he solidarity in production thus 
established will make it plain that any war between France 
and Germany becomes not merely unthinkable, but 
materially impossible.”31 Schuman’s idea was implemented 
in the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel 
Community—a body with supranational powers that 
Gerhard Bebr described as marking “a basic departure from 
                                                
	
	
30 Robert Schuman, Declaration of 9 May, FONDATION ROBERT SCHUMAN 
(May 9, 1950), https://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/declaration-of-9-
may-1950; see also JACQUES ZILLER, THE EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION 24 (Mel 
Marquis trans., 2005) (“From these words it may be inferred that 
European integration is a process of accretion whereby the interests of 
different States become, above all for pragmatic reasons, increasingly 
intertwined.”). 
31 Schuman, supra note 30; cf. William N. Parker, The Schuman Plan—A 
Preliminary Prediction, 6 INT’L ORG. 381, 383 (1952) (describing the 
Schuman Plan’s intent to create a single market in coal and steel: 
“Consequently, interferences with the free movement of these products, 
and all distortions of the picture of relative real costs are to be forbidden, 
regulated or discouraged. The member governments are obligated to 
abolish tariffs, quota restrictions, and impediments to the free movement 
of workers and to attack the problem of discriminatory freight rates. 
Subsidies to state-owned enterprises or to private producers are 
forbidden.”). 
12 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 25 
the conception of all previous international organizations.”32 
Subsequently, Europeans agreed to work together with 
respect to atomic energy and economic matters.33 The 
European Coal and Steel Community, Euratom, and the 
European Economic Community involved the establishment 
of a common market among the Member States—originally 
France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and 
Luxembourg34—with a common external tariff, and the 
                                                
	
	
32 Gerhard Bebr, The European Coal and Steel Community: A Political and 
Legal Innovation, 63 YALE L. J. 1, 1 (1953); Treaty Establishing the 
European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140.  
33 See Reuben Efron & Allan S. Nanes, The Common Market and Euratom 
Treaties: Supranationality and the Integration of Europe, 6 INT’L & COMP. L. 
Q. 670, 678 (1957) (noting that the supranational aspects of the Euratom 
and Common Market Treaties were less obvious than with the European 
Coal and Steel Community Treaty); id. at 682 (“[T]he framers of these 
treaties were evidently quite determined to avoid any demonstrative 
phraseology that would arouse the hostility of those industrialists and 
political leaders, particularly among the French and Germans, who 
object to any infringement on the principle of national sovereignty, 
whether from motives of ideology or economic interest. This is clearly 
brought out by the fact that in contrast to the Coal and Steel Community 
there is absolutely no mention of the word ‘supranationality.’ Yet, as the 
authors hope they have shown, this concept has been introduced 
through the back door, as it were, in a number of Articles in which 
supranationality is implied, if not expressed.”). 
34 Cf. Ivo Maes & Amy Verdun, Small States and the Creation of EMU: 
Belgium and the Netherlands, Pace-Setters and Gate-Keepers, 43 J. COMMON 
MKT. STUD. 327, 331 (2005) (“Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg 
founded the Benelux on 5 September 1944. The purpose was to set up a 
2017 EUROPEAN (DIS)UNION 13 
breaking down of barriers to free movement of goods, 
persons, services, and capital.35 This idea of the breaking 
down of barriers between separate national markets36 is 
often described as negative integration but, along with this 
negative integration, the European Treaties provided for 
positive integration through the harmonization of rules for a 
common European market.37 Jean Monnet argued that the 
development of new institutional mechanisms for European 
states to work together was “the most important event in the 
West since the war.”38 
																																								 																																							 																																							 															
	
	
customs union between these countries as soon as the Second World War 
was over.”). 
35 See Raymond Bertrand, The European Common Market Proposal, 10 INT’L 
ORG. 559 (1956). The European Free Trade Association was established in 
1959. U.W. Kitzinger, Europe: The Six and the Seven, 14 INT’L ORG. 20, 20 
(1960) (“[T]wo separate areas of free trade are being set up, at much the 
same pace, the ‘Inner Six’ centered around France and Germany, the 
‘Outer Seven’ around Britain and Scandinavia.”). 
36 See generally A.W.H. Meij & J.A. Winter, Measures Having an Effect 
Equivalent to Quantitative Restrictions, 13 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 79 (1976). 
37 Eric Stein, Assimilation of National Laws as a Function of European 
Integration, 58 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 1 (1964) (“[A]ssimilation of national laws 
in the Community is an integral part of an intricate plan for a 
progressive coalescence of the national economies of the six member 
states. Its special function in that plan is to remove those differences 
among national laws which impede the process of coalescence.”). 
38 Monnet, supra note 19, at 211 (“European unity is the most important 
event in the West since the war, not because it is a new great power, but 
because the new institutional method it introduces is permanently 
modifying relations between nations and men. Human nature does not 
14 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 25 
 In the early years, the implications of the new treaty 
arrangements were uncertain and ambiguous.39 Although 
early decisions of the European Court of Justice, such as 
Costa40 and van Gend en Loos,41 are now seen as the 
foundations of a process of Europeanization through law,42 
																																								 																																							 																																							 															
	
	
change, but when nations and men accept the same rules and the same 
institutions to make sure that they are applied, their behaviour towards 
each other changes. This is the process of civilization itself.”). 
39 See Leon N. Lindberg, Decision Making and Integration in the European 
Community, 19 INT’L ORG. 56, 58 (1965) (“[B]oth the architects of the 
Community treaties and the ministers and national experts who take 
common decisions in Brussels have rarely had any clear notion of what 
the consequences of these acts might be for their respective national 
systems, or indeed for the relations between themselves and between 
them and the rest of the world.”). 
40 Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585.  
41 Case 26/62, N. V. Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming 
van Gend en Loos v. Neth. Inland Revenue Admin. (van Gend en Loos), 
1963 E.C.R. 1; see also Stefan A. Riesenfeld & Richard M. Buxbaum, N. V. 
Algemene Transport- En Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos c. 
Administration Fiscale Néerlandaise: A Pioneering Decision of the Court of 
Justice of the European Communities, 58 Am. J. Int’l L. 152, 152 (1964) 
(stating that van Gend en Loos is “unquestionably one of the most 
important judgments rendered by that tribunal during the first decade of 
its existence”). 
42 See G. Federico Mancini & David T. Keeling, Democracy and the 
European Court of Justice, 57 MOD. L. REV. 175, 183 (1994) (“The effect of 
Van Gend en Loos was to take Community law out of the hands of 
politicians and bureaucrats and to give it to the people. Of all the Court’s 
democratising achievements none can rank so highly in practical 
terms.”). 
2017 EUROPEAN (DIS)UNION 15 
it was not always clear how Europe, its law, and its 
institutions would evolve.43 During the 1960s, there were 
political problems when Charles de Gaulle rebuffed the 
UK’s interest in joining the European project44 and when 
France’s withdrawal from the Council caused what 
commentators described as a “crisis,”45 or the “empty chair 
crisis,”46 but which was eventually resolved by means of the 
                                                
	
	
43 See Antoine Vauchez, The Force of a Weak Field: Law and Lawyers in the 
Government of the European Union (For a Renewed Research Agenda), 2 INT’L 
POL. SOC. 128, 131 (2008) (“The general idea is that Euro-law’s force is not 
a substantive feature related to a-historical characteristics of Law, but 
rather that it comes out of the various sorts of EU-related economic, 
political or bureaucratic struggles in which it has been enrolled in the 
course of European history.”). 
44 See generally Andrew Moravcsik, De Gaulle Between Grain and 
Grandeur: The Political Economy of French EC Policy, 1958–1970 (Part 1), 2 
J. COLD WAR STUD. 3, 4, 6 (2000); Roy Pryce, Britain Out of Europe?, 2 J. 
COMMON MKT. STUD. 1 (1963). 
45 John Lambert, The Constitutional Crisis 1965–66, 4 J. COMMON MKT. 
STUD. 195 (1966). Lambert predicted that similar issues would arise in the 
future. Id. at 228 (“The crisis of 1965–66 is to be seen as a constitutional 
clash, involving an attempt to change certain basic rules: but it was also 
probably part of a more long-term political conflict over the nature of the 
Community that in no way ceased when the immediate crisis ended on 
29 January. The difference in question can be expected to persist and to 
be reflected continually in relations between the member governments 
inside and outside the framework of the Treaties.”). 
46 See N. Piers Ludlow, Challenging French Leadership in Europe: Germany, 
Italy, the Netherlands and the Outbreak of the Empty Chair Crisis of 1965–
1966, 8 CONTEMP. EUR. HIST. 231, 232 (1999) (“A French boycott of the 
16 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 25 
Luxembourg compromise.47 After the compromise, policy-
making was slow,48 and commentators wondered whether 
supranationality had a future.49 It is clear that from the very 
beginning of the post-war European project, different actors 
had different ideas about what that project involved,50 or at 
least about who should make decisions about the framing of 
the project,51 and these differences of view have persisted 
																																								 																																							 																																							 															
	
	
Community institutions had begun and would last until the end of 
January 1966. Throughout this time, the French chair at all Community 
meetings would remain empty and the French viewpoint unstated, apart 
from periodic Delphic utterances by President de Gaulle and his senior 
ministers.”); see Id. at 233.  
47 Id. at 232–33. 
48 See Eric Stein, The European Community in 1983: A Less Perfect Union?, 20 
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 641, 647 (1983). 
49 See Nina Heathcote, The Crisis of European Supranationality, 5 J. 
COMMON MKT. STUD. 140, 141–42 (1966) (“The still-unresolved conflict of 
interest between the EEC’s national members is evidence that the 
organization is still an arena of power politics, unmodified by the 
supranational framework.”); see generally Maryon McDonald, “Unity in 
Diversity”: Some Tensions in the Construction of Europe, 4 SOC. 
ANTHROPOLOGY 47 (1996). 
50 Loveday, supra note 19. 
51 See Ludlow, supra note 46, at 233 (“The breakdown of June 1965, the 
article will suggest, should be seen not as the product of French 
dissatisfaction with the Community as it existed, but on the contrary as 
the outcome of mounting frustration amongst all of France’s partners, 
Germany, Italy and the Netherlands in particular, about the extent to 
which the French had been able to dominate the formative years of the 
EEC.”). 
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through periodic enlargements of membership. 
 The European project achieved forward movement in 
one direction when the UK, Denmark and Ireland acceded to 
the treaties in 1973,52 although the enlargement raised new 
questions about the legal and political implications of 
enlargement,53 as well as the economic impact of 
enlargement.54 The introduction of new Member States with 
different interests and including actors with more different 
views made agreement on the future of Europe more, rather 
than less, complicated.55 But although enlargement was 
progress of a sort, the widening was not accompanied by the 
                                                
	
	
52 Treaty of Accession of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom 
(1972), O.J. No. L 73 (Mar. 27, 1972). 
53 See Stanley Henig, New Institutions for European Integration 12 J. 
COMMON MKT. STUD. 129 (1973); L.J. Brinkhorst & M.J. Kuiper, The 
Integration of the New Member States in the Community Legal Order, 9 
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 364 (1972). Norway also negotiated to join, but 
Norwegian citizens voted to reject membership. See Einar Lie, Masters 
and Servants: Economists and Bureaucrats in the Dispute Over Norwegian 
EEC Membership in 1972, 24 CONTEMP. EUR. HIST. 279 (2015). 
54 W. G. C. M. Haack, The Economic Effects of Britain’s Entry into the 
Common Market, 11 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 136 (1972). 
55 See Stein, supra note 48, at 655 (“In the running debate on the 
Community’s future, some wonder whether the original Community 
pattern, although suitable for a homogenous group of six states, is 
workable for a Community of ten, twelve or more states with diverse 
cultures, legal systems and levels of development (Greece, Portugal, 
Spain, eventually Turkey).”). 
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sort of deepening that many hoped for.56 During the 1970s 
European states grappled with economic problems which 
raised questions about the usefulness of European 
integration.57 Nevertheless, further enlargements followed: 
Greece acceded in 1981,58 and Spain and Portugal followed 
in 1986.59 But enlargement was part of what led 
commentators to speculate about possibilities for a multi-
speed Europe in which different rules would apply to 
                                                
	
	
56 Some have argued that deepening should occur before widening. See, 
e.g., Ziller, supra note 30, at 153 (“[M]any have repeatedly argued that the 
integration project must be consolidated and “deepened” before the 
Community— with the argument now applying to the Union— is 
expanded any further.”). 
57 See Report by Mr. Leo Tindemans, Prime Minister of Belgium, to the 
European Council, on the European Union, E.C. BULL. Supp., no. 1 (1976) 
at 11 (“[W]e plunged into a crisis and are experiencing rates of inflation 
and unemployment the likes of which have never been seen by the 
present generation. It is therefore hardly surprising if the Community is 
crumbling beneath the resurgence, which is felt everywhere, of purely 
national preoccupations. Especially as the Community, in its present 
state, is unbalanced: in some fields it has been given far-reaching 
powers, in others nothing, or practically nothing, has been done, very 
often because our States were too weak to undertake anything new . . .”). 
58 See, e.g., Commission Opinion of 23 May 1979 on the application for 
accession to the European Communities by the Hellenic Republic, 1979 
O.J. (L 291) 22. 
59 See Decision of the Council of the European Communities of 11 June 
1985 on the Accession of the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese 
Republic to the European Coal and Steel Community, 1985 O.J. (L 302) 
28. 
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different Member States.60  
 By 1991, after the adoption of the Single European 
Act,61 Andrew Moravscik identified a new period of hope 
for the future of Europe.62 The Single European Act was 
presented as a reinvigoration of the European project where 
the Member States agreed to work at creating an internal 
market for Europe (a reframing of the original common 
                                                
	
	
60 See Alexander C-G. Stubb, A Categorization of Differentiated Integration, 
34 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 283 (1996); Alberto Alesina & Vittorio Grilli, 
On the Feasibility of a One-speed or Multispeed European Monetary Union, 5 
ECON. & POL.145, 146 (1993) (arguing that “proceeding at “two speeds” 
or more will jeopardize the achievement of complete integration.”); 
Eberhard Grabitz & Bernd Langeheine, Legal Problems Related to a 
Proposed “Two-Tier System” of Integration Within the European Community, 
18 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 33 (1981). 
61 See Juliet Lodge, The Single European Act: Towards a New Euro-
Dynamism?, 24 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 203 (1986). 
62 See Andrew Moravcsik, Negotiating the Single European Act: National 
Interests and Conventional Statecraft in the European Community, 45 INT’L 
ORG. 19, 19 (1991) (“The late 1970s and early 1980s were periods of 
‘Europessimism’ and ‘Eurosclerosis,’ when politicians and academics 
alike lost faith in European institutions. The current period is one of 
optimism and institutional momentum.”) Cf. Neil Fligstein & Iona Mara-
Drita, How to Make a Market: Reflections on the Attempt to Create a Single 
Market in the European Union, 102 AM. J. SOC. 1, 3 (1996) (noting that the 
single market “project took the EU from an organization in crisis to one 
that was able to attain some remarkable agreements.”); contra e.g., 
Lodge, supra note 61, at 221 (noting “a danger... that the pragmatism that 
it embodies may, as in the past, discourage Member States from taking 
the steps necessary for progress”).  
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market idea rather than a wholly new project)63 by the end 
of 1992.64 It was initially unclear what this single market 
would involve,65 although the Commission published a 
White Paper in 1985 with an analysis of the steps necessary 
to create a single market.66 The UK joined in agreeing to the 
Single European Act and the 1992 initiative.67 
 Comparing the attitudes to the condition of Europe of 
observers at the beginning of the 1990s with attitudes in 
2017, there seems to be a contrast between attitudes of hope 
(then) and attitudes of uncertainty and anxiety (now).68 This 
raises the question of how Europe changed from an 
                                                
	
	
63 See Fligstein & Mara-Drita, supra note 62, at 11.  
64 See PAOLO CECCHINI, THE EUROPEAN CHALLENGE: 1992 THE BENEFITS OF 
A SINGLE MARKET (1988). 
65 Fligstein & Mara-Drita, supra note 62, at 11 (“The biggest problem of 
this idea was to define what a single market meant.”); cf. Lodge, supra 
note 61, at 210-212. 
66 See generally Commission White Paper: Completing the Internal Market, 
COM (85) 310 final (June 14, 1985). 
67 See, e.g., Daddow, supra note 17, at 217 (“It should not be forgotten, 
however, that in between times, [Margaret Thatcher] willingly signed 
Britain up to one of the most integrationist European treaties of recent 
times, the 1986 Single European Act (SEA), which created the single 
European market in the 1990s.”). 
68 The twenty-seven Member States apart from the UK have, as of 
August 2017, managed the process of negotiating over Brexit more 
effectively than the UK has, increasing confidence within the EU, but 
uncertainties and anxieties remain. See European Council Meeting 
Conclusions, EUCO 8/17 (Jun. 23, 2017) (noting concerns relating to 
terrorism, defense, climate change, jobs and growth, and migration). 
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enterprise of hope to an existential crisis. Three sets of issues 
help to understand this evolution. The first involves the 
problematic ideas of an ever-closer union and a single 
market, and the idea of continuous forward movement. The 
second relates to crisis and the European (and national and 
international) response to crisis. The third involves the 
conflict between technocratic and political governance. But it 
should also be noted that the contrast between then and now 
may be less stark than some sources suggest. From the 
beginning, the European project involved differences of 
opinion and uncertainties that sometimes were more 
obvious and sometimes less so. 2017 may be one of those 
periods where the tensions are more visible. 
 
III. 1992 AND BEYOND: AN EVER-CLOSER UNION, A SINGLE 
MARKET, AND CONTINUOUS FORWARD MOVEMENT  
 
 Although the Single Market Act proposed the 
creation of a single European market in 1992, many 
commentators think that the EU’s single market is 
incomplete twenty-five years later.69 Ideas embedded in the 
European treaties such as the internal market and ever-
                                                
	
	
69 See, e.g., Mario Mariniello, André Sapir & Alessio Terzi, The Long Road 
Towards the European Single Market, 2 (Bruegel Working Paper 2015/01 
2015) (noting that a “commonly held opinion among observers today is 
that the single market is far from being complete.”). 
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closer union,70 have always been ambiguous and susceptible 
to different interpretations. It has never been clear, for 
example, whether a single market requires uniform rules or 
not, and, if not, how much differentiation in rules is 
consistent with a single market.71 These ambiguities are the 
product of differences in views among the negotiators of the 
texts. Ambiguity allows for agreement without the need to 
pin down exactly what is agreed. Ambiguity then allows for 
subsequent political negotiation to determine the contours of 
the European project (although some ambiguities are 
resolved through decisions of courts rather than legislators 
or Treaty negotiators.). However, ambiguity also leaves 
open opportunities for contestation which can be 
problematic.  
 The Court of Justice has resolved some textual 
ambiguities in the Treaties by adopting a teleological 
approach to interpretation, an approach which is sometimes 
characterized as “constitutionalizing” the Treaties or as 
                                                
	
	
70 See Andrew Moravcsik, The European Constitutional Settlement, 31 THE 
WORLD ECONOMY 157, 157 (2008) (“For five decades, the primary concern 
of European integration was summarised in the 1950s-era technocratic 
slogan embedded in the Treaty of Rome’s preamble: ‘Ever Closer 
Union.’”). 
71 Cf. Barry Eichengreen, European Monetary Unification, 31, J. ECON. LIT. 
1321, 1322 (1993) (“I dispute the belief that a single currency is a 
technically necessary concomitant of a single market in capital, labor, 
and goods.”). 
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being “creative.”72 Beyond resolving ambiguities, the Court 
of Justice has also developed EU law over time in ways not 
compelled by the express language of the Treaties.73 For 
example, the Court recognized that fundamental rights were 
part of EU law before they were spelled out in the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights.74 Another example is the 
                                                
	
	
72 See G. Federico Mancini, The Making of a Constitution for Europe, 26 
COMMON MKT. L REV. 595, 596 (1989) (“[T]he Court has sought to 
‘constitutionalise’ the Treaty, that is to fashion a constitutional 
framework for a federal-type structure in Europe.”); See also, e.g., id. at 
599 (“The now undisputed existence of a supremacy clause in the 
Community framework is therefore a product of judicial creativeness.”); 
Cf. Dagmar Schiek, The ECJ Decision in Mangold: A Further Twist on Effects 
of Directives and Constitutional Relevance of Community Equality Legislation, 
35 INDUS. L. J. 329, 335 (2006) (“With Mangold, the Court of Justice grants 
a more far-reaching effect to the prohibition of discrimination on 
grounds of age. The recognition of the constitutional quality of the 
prohibition on discrimination will surely have consequences beyond 
Mangold, especially as it can hardly remain confined to the ground of 
age.”).  
73 See, e.g., Vauchez, supra note 43, at 134 (“Principles such as ‘direct 
effect,’ ‘supremacy,’ ‘principle of proportionality’ or ‘rule of speciality,’ 
which have become undisputed description tools of the EU polity, are 
specific legal constructions that do not draw on the treaties themselves as 
much as they do on the science of law for which, at the end of the day, 
lawyers are the only judges.”). 
74 See Jason Coppell & Aidan O’Neill, The European Court of Justice: 
Taking Rights Seriously?, 29 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 669, 670-1 (1992) 
(“[T]he European Court discovered that the protection of fundamental 
rights was indeed a general principle of European Community law. This 
development ...was effected notwithstanding the absence of any mention 
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Court’s enhancement of the enforceability of citizens’ legal 
rights by the recognition of a right for people to go to court 
in a Member State and claim damages for the Member 
State’s violations of EU law.75 This right to damages has 
itself evolved over time,76 so that a claim in damages against 
the State may now relate to the failure of courts in the 
																																								 																																							 																																							 															
	
	
or list of fundamental rights within the texts of the Community 
treaties.”); Joseph H.H. Weiler, Eurocracy and Distrust: Some Questions 
Concerning the Role of the European Court of Justice in the Protection of 
Fundamental Human Rights Within the Legal Order of the European 
Communities, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1103, 1105 (1986) (“If one ever needed an 
example of sheer judicial power it would appear to be in this particular 
“saga.” . . . in the absence of a written bill of rights in the Treaty and an 
apparent freedom for the Community legislature to disregard individual 
rights in Community legislation, the European Court of Justice, in an 
exercise of bold judicial activism, and a reversal of earlier case law, 
created a judge-made higher law of fundamental human rights, culled 
from the constitutional traditions of the Member States and international 
agreements such as the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR).”).  
75 See, e.g., Paul Craig, Francovich, Remedies and the Scope of Damages 
Liability, 109 L. Q. REV. 595, 596 (1993) (“The existence of liability was 
established through a blend of reasoning from first principle, and 
through reliance on textual foundation in the Treaty itself.”). 
76 See Carol Harlow, Francovich and the Problem of the Disobedient State, 2 
EUR. L. J. 199 (1996). Cf. Tobias Lock, Is Private Enforcement of EU Law 
Through State Liability a Myth?: An Assessment 20 Years after Francovich, 49 
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1675 (2012). 
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Member State to interpret and apply EU law properly.77 
Member State governments who see the Court of Justice as 
interpreting the Treaties in surprising ways may react by 
becoming entrenched in positions which are not favourable 
to the promotion of the European project.78 Worries about 
European overreach led to the development of the doctrine 
of subsidiarity,79 and over time the ways in which the EU 
                                                
	
	
77 See, e.g., Lock, supra note 76, at 1676 (“In Köbler the ECJ later extended 
the doctrine of Member State liability to also cover breaches by the 
judiciary where the infringement of European Union law was 
manifest.”). 
78 Cf. Vauchez, supra note 43, at 141 (“It is well known that over the past 
15 years the number of critics of the ECJ has increased far beyond the 
restricted circles of eurosceptics. It comes as no surprise that the recent 
politicization of EU debates is now touching the European Court of 
Justice... itself denounced for its many biases (from its neo-liberal or 
ordo-liberal agenda to its ‘tentacular’ development at the expense of 
national legal sovereignty).”). 
79 See, e.g., Andreas Føllesdal, Subsidiarity, 6 J. OF POL. PHIL. 190, 191(1998) 
(“The principle of subsidiarity was introduced in the European Union in 
the late 1980s through the initiative of the European Parliament, Britain 
and Germany in response to fears of centralized power by placing the 
burden of argument with integrationists.”); Cf. Kees van Kersbergen & 
Bertjan Verbeek, The Politics of Subsidiarity in the European Union, 32 J. 
COMMON MKT. STUD. 215, 216 (1994) (“[T]he theory of subsidiarity was 
put on the European political agenda in the late 1970s by Christian 
democratic members of the European Parliament in an interesting, yet—
in light of recent developments—paradoxical effort to justify the 
enlargement of the competences of the European Commission. It was only in 
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managed subsidiarity have evolved to include national 
parliaments as subsidiarity monitors.80 However, 
subsidiarity, like other aspects of the EU, has its own 
ambiguities.81 Recently, concern about decisions of the Court 
of Justice have been part of the UK Government’s discomfort 
with EU membership (although sometimes the roles of the 
Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights 
seem to have become intertwined in politicians’ 
imaginations).82 
 The UK is not the only locus of resistance to the idea 
that European Court decisions might pre-empt conflicting 
																																								 																																							 																																							 															
	
	
the 1990s that subsidiarity evolved into a principle for curbing the 
potential expansion of power of the European Commission.”). 
80 See Ian Cooper, The Watchdogs of Subsidiarity: National Parliaments and 
the Logic of Arguing in the EU, 44 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 281 (2006). 
81 See, e.g., van Kersbergen & Verbeek, supra note 79, at 221 (“Three views 
of the relationship between state and society have furnished three 
different interpretations of subsidiarity: (1) christian democratic 
ideology, (2) German federalism, and (3) British conservatism. The 
lowest common denominator of all three is a narrow legal view which 
envisions subsidiarity solely as a constitutional arrangement between 
central and local public actors.”). 
82 Cf. House of Lords, European Union Committee, The UK, the EU and a 
British Bill of Rights, HL Paper 139 (May 9, 2016) at 8 (“The EU Charter is 
often confused with the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR), as the Court of Justice of the EU in Luxembourg (the CJEU) is 
with the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg (the ECtHR). 
While both contain overlapping human rights provisions, they operate 
within separate legal frameworks.”). 
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domestic law.83 Whereas the Court of Justice has been very 
clear that EU law has the characteristic of supremacy,84 
national courts have not always accepted this idea 
unconditionally. Germany is the most prominent example of 
this tension between EU supremacy and domestic 
Constitutional law.85 Over many years the Court of Justice 
and German courts navigated this terrain very carefully, but 
the tension resurfaced in the wake of the financial crisis 
when German citizens challenged some of the EU’s 
                                                
	
	
83 Cf. Karen J. Alter, Who are the “Masters of the Treaty”?: European 
Governments and the European Court of Justice, 50 INT’L ORG. 121, 123 
(1998) (“The ECJ, however, interpreted existing EC laws in ways that 
member states had not intended and in ways that compromised strongly 
held interests and beliefs. As member states began to object to ECJ 
jurisprudence, they found it difficult to change EU legislation to reverse 
court decisions or to attack the jurisdiction and authority of the ECJ. 
Because there was no consensus among states to attack the authority of 
the ECJ, member states lacked a credible threat that could cow the Court 
into quiescence. Instead, the institutional rules combined with the lack of 
political consensus gave the ECJ significant room to maneuver.”). 
84 See Id. at 126. 
85See Philipp Kiiver, The Lisbon Judgment of the German Constitutional 
Court: A Court-ordered Strengthening of the National Legislature in the EU 16 
EUR. L. J.578 (2010); Gunnar Beck, The Lisbon Judgment of the German 
Constitutional Court, the Primacy of EU Law and the Problem of Kompetenz- 
Kompetenz: A Conflict between Right and Right in Which There is No Praetor, 
17 EUR. L. J. 470 (2011).  
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responses on the basis that they were ultra vires.86 The courts’ 
reactions to these issues have been unusual. One 
commentator wrote that “if the preliminary referral in OMT 
evidenced an unexpected desire on the part of the BVG to set 
the entire system on fire by actually declaring an EU act ultra 
vires, the ECJ in Gauweiler appeared completely content to 
drop off matches and lighter fluid at the front door of the 
Federal Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe.”87 
 The European project is often analyzed in terms of 
moving forward, or failing to do so.88 Progress or forward 
movement is inherent in the terminology of an ever-closer 
                                                
	
	
86 See, e.g., Monica Claes & Jan-Herman Reestman, The Protection of 
National Constitutional Identity and the Limits of European Integration at the 
Occasion of the Gauweiler Case, 16 GER. L. J. 917 (2015). 
87 John Henry Dingfelder Stone, Agreeing to Disagree: The Primacy Debate 
Between the German Federal Constitutional Court and the European Court of 
Justice, 25 MINN. J. INT’L L. 127, 150 (2016). 
88 See, e.g., Erik Jones, R. Daniel Kelemen & Sophie Meunier, Failing 
Forward? The Euro Crisis and the Incomplete Nature of European Integration, 
49 COMP. POL. STUD. 1010, 1012 (2015) (“Why have piecemeal responses 
forged by minimum winning coalitions in the heat of crisis consistently 
moved the EU in the direction of deeper integration over time, rather 
than toward a dismantling of shared governance institutions and market 
structures? This tendency to pursue ever deeper integration is a puzzle 
because it suggests that there is an underlying dynamic connecting 
iterated intergovernmental bargains. As a result of this dynamic, the EU 
appears to “fail forward”: again and again responding to the failures of 
incremental reforms by taking new steps to expand the scope and 
intensity of integration.”). 
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union, and, although the idea of an ever-closer union might 
seem to require only the deepening of relationships between 
the Member States, in fact it has also involved widening, or 
an expansion of membership.89 The emphasis on progress 
towards closer union means that failures to achieve forward 
movements are risky:90 managing Europe is sometimes 
analogized to riding a bicycle (where stopping risks falling 
off).91 Enlargement is a component of this forward 
                                                
	
	
89 On enlargements since 1991, see Roger J. Goebel, The European Union 
Grows: The Constitutional Impact of the Accession of Austria, Finland and 
Sweden, 18 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 1092 (1994); Pridham, supra note 13; see 
also Frank Schimmelfennig, EU Political Accession Conditionality After the 
2004 Enlargement: Consistency and Effectiveness, 15 J. EUR. PUB. POLY. 918 
(2008). 
90 See, e.g., Henig, supra note 53, at p 129 (“By its very nature the 
Community cannot stand still: the notion of consolidation is alien to the 
process of integration. When ‘spill-over’ becomes inoperative and 
member governments refuse to extend the sphere of integration, the 
Community is bound to wither.”). Cf. Luigi Guiso et al., supra note 16, at 
251 (“Since the survival of the euro is dependent upon further transfers 
of national powers to the EU, then the European Project seems to be 
stuck: Europeans do not want to go forward, they do not want to go 
backward, but they cannot stay still.”). 
91 See Rorden Wilkinson, Language, Power and Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations, 16 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 597, 604 (2009) (“At its simplest, 
the bicycle metaphor suggests that trade liberalization, like the forward 
motion required to keep a bicycle moving, needs to be in a state of 
perpetual motion. If that motion were to cease, the process (like the 
bicycle) would collapse and cause injury to the global economy/the 
bicycle’s rider.”) Wilkinson discusses the metaphor with respect to trade 
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movement but enlargement involves complexities. The new 
Member States need to adapt to the existing acquis 
communautaire, both in terms of formal adjustment of their 
legal regimes, but also in terms of adjusting their approach 
to government. Compliance with EU norms relating to the 
rule of law is expected,92 but not always achieved, and it is 
hard for the EU institutions to police non-compliance 
effectively.93 
 If the move from six to ten Member States made 
agreement more complex, the transition to a Union of 
twenty-eight Member States increased this complexity 
significantly. Enlargements increasing the diversity of the 
Member States have implications for social cohesion in the 
																																								 																																							 																																							 															
	
	
liberalization generally, rather than specifically with respect to the EU. 
For the bicycle metaphor with respect to the EU see, e.g., Moravcsik, 
supra note 70, at 158. 
92 See Commission Communication, A New EU Framework to Strengthen the 
Rule of Law, COM (2014) 158 final/2 (Mar. 19, 2014).  
93 See, e.g., Commission Recommendation Regarding the Rule of Law in Poland, 
at 7, C (2016) 8950 final (Dec. 21, 2016) (“[T]he present Recommendation 
complements the Recommendation of 27 July 2016. It examines which of 
the concerns raised in that recommendation have been addressed, sets 
out the remaining concerns and lists a number of new concerns of the 
Commission with regard to the rule of law in Poland which have arisen 
since then. On this basis, it makes recommendations to the Polish 
authorities on how to address these concerns.”). 
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EU,94 which again makes political agreement among the 
Member States more difficult to achieve.95 And some 
national governments have decided to seek the approval of 
their citizens for EU developments, which means that 
changes need citizen as well as governmental approval. The 
EU’s attempt to adopt a Constitutional Treaty, after a 
prolonged complex negotiating process involving 
participants from national parliaments, national 
governments, the European Parliament and the 
Commission,96 and an Intergovernmental Conference,97 
managed to overcome the difficulty of achieving agreement 
among the Member State governments,98 only to run into 
opposition from citizens expressed in referenda.99 In the end, 
                                                
	
	
94 See Jan Delhey, Do Enlargements Make the European Union Less Cohesive? 
An Analysis of Trust between EU Nationalities, 45 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 
253 (2007). 
95 See Schneider, supra note 5. 
96 See Ziller, supra note 30, at 85. 
97 Id. at 106-115. 
98 Id., at 29 (“[I]t is clear that the imperfect but impressive text produced 
by the Convention— later adopted mostly intact by the European 
Council— is a hybrid text reflecting hard-won compromises between 
opposing visions of the purpose and direction of European 
integration.”). 
99 See Paul Taggart, Questions of Europe – The Domestic Politics of the 2005 
French and Dutch Referendums and their Challenge for the Study of European 
Integration, 44 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. ANNUAL REVIEW 7 (2006).  
32 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 25 
the EU managed to find a way through the opposition.100 
 The EU Member States are diverse: in terms of size101 
and wealth102: Luxembourg has a population of about 
550,000 people, but is very wealthy; Bulgaria has a 
population 14 times that of Luxembourg but its GDP is 
smaller. In 2014, the GDPs of the EU Member States ranged 
from $11.2 billion (Malta103, which has an even smaller 
population than Luxembourg) to nearly $4 trillion 
                                                
	
	
100 See Michael Dougan, The Treaty of Lisbon 2007: Winning Minds, Not 
Hearts, 45 COMMON MKT L. REV. 617 (2008); Dinan, supra note 8. 
101 Influence within the EU system is not inevitably merely a function of 
size. See, e,.g., Maes & Verdun, supra note 34, at 330 (“The influence of 
states on the European integration process is related only in part to their 
size.”). 
102 Moravcsik, supra note 70, at 163 (noting, with respect to the 2004 
enlargement, that “[t]he GDP of the 10 new members of the EU totaled 
only 3 percent of the GDP of existing members, and their demands on 
existing EU budgetary spending, agricultural policy and free movement 
rules were carefully restricted.”); Cf. Schneider, supra note 5, at 701 (“All 
studies assume that enlargement has generally increased the 
heterogeneity of preferences among EU members. Empirically, 
heterogeneity of preferences has been measured mostly as the 
heterogeneity in gross domestic product (GDP) within the Council 
because income is an important conflict dimension.”); Schneider argues 
that enlargement does not have the same sort of impact on partisan 
heterogeneity, which is affected by elections. See Id. at 709.  
103 See, e.g. Malta, The World Bank, (last visited Dec. 15, 2017), 
https://data.worldbank.org/country/malta.   
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(Germany104, which has a population of over 80 million). 
There are economic differences between the Member States 
in terms of how developed their economies are and how 
significant agriculture or fishing or financial services are to 
the economy. The refugee crisis highlighted differences 
between the different Member States: Italy and Greece, 
located at the edges of the EU nearest to the origins of the 
refugees have been more directly affected by an influx of 
refugees than other Member States further away.105 Some 
Member States have more diverse populations than others, 
although identifying causal relationships between 
population diversity and attitudes to immigration is 
                                                
	
	
104 See, e.g. Germany, The World Bank, (last visited Dec. 15, 2017), 
https://data.worldbank.org/country/Germany.  
105 See EU Commission & High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy, Joint Communication: Migration on the Central 
Mediterranean Route Managing Flows, Saving Lives, at 3, JOIN (2017) 4 final 
(Jan. 25, 2017) (“In 2016, over 181,000 irregular migrants were detected 
on the Central Mediterranean route, the vast majority of whom reached 
Italy. Italy reported an 18% increase in arrivals compared to 2015, a 
number even surpassing the previous peak of 2014. Arrivals to Malta are 
low in comparison. Libya was the main country of departure for almost 
90% of migrants, followed by Egypt (7%), Turkey (1.9%), Algeria (0.6%) 
and Tunisia (0.5%).”) The agreement between the EU and Turkey 
reduced the impact of migration on Greece; Commission Communication, 
Eighth Report on Relocation and Resettlement, at 6, COM (2016) 791 final 
(Dec. 8, 2016) (citing variations in the willingness of Member States to 
accept relocation of refugees from Italy and Greece, and in particular, 
that Austria and Hungary had not participated in any relocations or 
pledges to do so). 
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complex,106 and even the more diverse Member States 
include citizens who focus on national identity, which can 
result in hostility to immigration and immigrants, whether 
from other EU Member States or from outside the EU.107  
 The differences between the Member States matter 
when they make reaching agreement on policy questions 
more difficult,108 and when policy decisions combine 
different Member States in regimes (like the regime for the 
Euro) that do not take full account of the differences.109 In 
                                                
	
	
106 James Laurence & Lee Bentley, Does Ethnic Diversity Have a Negative 
Effect on Attitudes towards the Community? A Longitudinal Analysis of the 
Causal Claims within the Ethnic Diversity and Social Cohesion Debate, 32 
EUR. SOCIOL. REV. 54 (2015). Attitudes to immigration may be influenced 
by individuals’ personality traits; Markus Freitag & Carolin Rapp, The 
Personal Foundations of Political Tolerance towards Immigrants, 41 J. ETHNIC 
MIGRATION STUD. 351 (2015). 
107 Cf. John Sides & Jack Citrin, European Opinion About Immigration: The 
Role of Identities, Interests and Information, 37 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 477, 478 
(2007) (“Amid all the talk of a growing sense of European identity, the 
present research points to the explanatory power of identification with 
the nation-state and beliefs about the nation-state’s cultural identity.”). 
108 Andrew Moravcsik, Preferences and Power in the European Community: 
A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach, 31 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 473, 474 
(1993) (arguing that Europe should be seen in terms of “liberal 
intergovernmentalism: a liberal theory of how economic 
interdependence influences national interests, and an 
intergovernmentalist theory of international negotiation.”).  
109 Economic and Monetary Union combined Germany, a strong 
economy with a strong currency with other, weaker economies with 
weaker currencies. The Stability and Growth Pact was designed to 
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addition to economic differences there are also differences 
between the Member States in attitudes to religion,110 and in 
the diversity of their populations.111 And the possible 
accession of Turkey112— supported by the EU’s reliance on 
																																								 																																							 																																							 															
	
	
address this problem. Martin Heipertz & Amy Verdun, The Dog That 
Would Never Bite? What We Can Learn from the Origins of the Stability and 
Growth Pact, 11 J. Eur. Pub. Pol’y 765, 768 (2004) (“The political 
background of the SGP can be traced back to German domestic politics. 
It was used to comfort public opinion and to appease the Bundesbank. 
The German public needed reassurance on EMU as it had become 
extremely anxious about giving up the well-proven Deutschmark in 
favour of a new single currency that would include traditionally weak 
economies which lacked a stability culture”) But the Stability and 
Growth Pact was not very effective. See id. at 776 (“A number of 
countries no longer act as if the SGP budgetary ceilings are to be taken 
seriously”) Eventually there was a crisis in the Euro Area.  
110 Ziller, supra note 30, at 5. 
111 See, e.g., ANIKO HORVATH ET AL, TOLERANCE AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY 
DISCOURSES IN HUNGARY, Reports 4 (CTR. POL’Y STUD. 2011) (“Immigrants 
in Hungary, although very small in number, are also typically viewed 
with a combination of fear and distrust.”); cf. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CULTURALLY DIVERSE SOCIETIES GUIDELINES ADOPTED 
BY THE COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS AND COMPILATION OF COUNCIL OF 
EUROPE STANDARDS 9 (2016) (“Conscious of the increasing cultural 
diversity in European societies and underlining that diversity is a source 
of enrichment which calls for mutual understanding and respect for each 
other”). 
112 Turkey expressed interest in becoming part of the European project in 
1987. Cf Schimmelfennig, supra note 89, at 919 (“[E]ven existing 
commitments to Turkey and the Western Balkans have come under 
pressure from relevant member states. After 2004, ‘enlargement fatigue’ 
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Turkey to manage the immigration crisis,113 but imperiled by 
the state of emergency which raises issues of human rights 
and the rule of law114— would only increase the differences 
between EU Member States. 
 Deepening—development of an ever-closer union 
between the Member State—has occurred along with 
enlargement. The Maastricht Treaty began the transition 
from a European Community to a European Union, and 
introduced new “pillars” of European integration: a 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), police and 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters, the idea of 
																																								 																																							 																																							 															
	
	
has been seen as the prevailing mood in Brussels, in many member state 
capitals, and among EU citizens.”).  
113 See, e.g., EU-Turkey Statement Press Release 144/16 (Mar. 18, 2016); 
Cf. Commission Communication, A European Agenda on Migration, at 2, 
COM (2015) 240 final (May 13, 2015) (“Emergency measures have been 
necessary because the collective European policy on the matter has fallen 
short. While most Europeans have responded to the plight of the 
migrants, the reality is that across Europe, there are serious doubts about 
whether our migration policy is equal to the pressure of thousands of 
migrants, to the need to integrate migrants in our societies, or to the 
economic demands of a Europe in demographic decline.”). 
114 See, e.g., Kareem Shaheen, Patrick Wintour & Jennifer Rankin, Turkey 
Threatens to End Refugee Deal in Row over EU Accession, THE GUARDIAN 
(Nov. 25, 2016). If Turkey were an EU Member State its actions against 
judges, prosecutors, journalists, mayors, removing parliamentary 
immunity from deputies of the National Assembly, would involve issues 
with respect to Treaty provisions on the rule of law. 
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European citizenship, and economic and monetary union.115 
These aspects of deepening have not, however, all been 
unproblematic. Economic and monetary union and the euro 
were conceived as much for political as for economic 
reasons, and failures of compliance with the requirements of 
the Stability and Growth Pact and political failures to police 
compliance with those requirements led to a European 
sovereign debt crisis.116 The (disputed) notion that the EU is 
the source of an ever increasing, and even excessive, 
proportion of domestic rule-making in the Member States,117 
                                                
	
	
115 See Joseph M. Grieco, the Maastricht Treaty, Economic and Monetary 
Union and the Neo-Realist Research Programme 21 REV. INT’L STUD. 21 
(1995).  
116 See, e.g., Philip R. Lane, The European Sovereign Debt Crisis, 26 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 49, 56 (2012) (noting that the “revelation of extreme violation of 
the euro’s fiscal rules on the part of Greece also shaped an influential 
political narrative of the crisis, which laid the primary blame on the fiscal 
irresponsibility of the peripheral nations, even though the underlying 
financial and macroeconomic imbalances were more important 
factors.”). 
117 Moravcsik, supra note 70, at 175 (“In 1988, Jacques Delors famously 
predicted that in 10 years ‘80 percent of economic, and perhaps social 
and fiscal policy-making’ in Europe would be of EU origin. This 
prediction has become a fundamental ‘factoid’ in discussions of the EU–
often cited as a claim that 80 percent of law making in all issues in 
Europe already comes from Brussels. Yet recent academic studies 
demonstrate that the actual percentage of EU-based legislation is 
probably between 10 and 20 percent of national rule making.”). 
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produces political opposition.118 
 Other aspects of deepening within the EU over the 
last quarter century include the evolution of institutional 
structures.119 For example, the allocation of voting rights 
among citizens and the Member States has changed,120 the 
EU Parliament has more power than it used to have,121 many 
EU legislative measures are now adopted on the basis of a 
legislative procedure involving the Parliament and approval 
by a majority of the Member States representing a majority 
of the EU population;122 and there is a broad range of EU 
level agencies.123 As a result of the prevalence of legislation 
                                                
	
	
118 See Mark Pollack, The End of Creeping Competence? EU Policy-Making 
Since Maastricht, 39J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 519, 520 (2000) (arguing that 
during the 1990s there was a “backlash against the spread of centralized 
policy-making in the EU.”). 
119 Moravcsik, supra note 70 (discussing the evolution of institutional 
structures). 
120 See Christopher Lord & Johannes Pollak, Unequal but Democratic? 
Equality According to Karlsruhe, 20 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 190 (2013). 
121 See Moravcsik, supra note 70, at 178 (“[T]he EU itself has not increased 
in popularity with the significant expansion in the powers of the EP over 
the past five years.”). 
122 Charlotte Burns, Anne Rasmussen, & Christine Reh, Legislative 
Codecision and its Impact on the Political System of the European Union, 20 J. 
EUR. PUB. POL’Y 941 (2013) (introducing a special issue on twenty years of 
legislative codecision in the European Union). 
123 Morten Egeberg & Jarle Trondal, Researching European Union Agencies: 
What Have We Learnt (and Where Do We Go from Here)?, 55 J. COMMON 
MKT. STUD.1, 1-16 (2017). 
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by majority vote, member states are bound by legislative 
measures they may not have agreed with. Also, there has 
been an increase in the number of EU level rules. Over time 
there is more harmonization of more aspects of the law in 
the EU member states.124 
 The combination of the supremacy or primacy of EU 
law, and a perception that decisions about legal rules and 
policy are increasingly taken by EU institutions rather than 
by national governments, became a problem after the onset 
of the financial crisis. Citizens who tolerated centralization 
of decision-making when times were good were less happy 
with such centralization in times of crisis.125 For example, the 
EU and the IMF imposed austerity measures on Greece as a 
condition of financial support, and these measures generated 
mass opposition in Greece.126  
 The next section of the paper looks at how crises have 
                                                
	
	
124 Upgrading the Single Market: More Opportunities for People and Business, 
at 1, COM (2015) 550 final (Oct. 28, 2015) (“The European Commission 
that came into office in November 2014 is responding to these challenges. 
It has made increasing jobs, growth and investment its top priority and is 
pursuing it by deepening the Single Market across sectors and policy 
areas.”). 
125 See Fabio Serricchio, Myrto Tsakatika & Lucia Quaglia, Euroscepticism 
and the Global Financial Crisis, 51 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 51 (2013) (“[T]he 
crisis seems to have enhanced the role of public confidence in national 
political institutions, and that of national identity, in accounting for 
Eurosceptic tendencies at the level of public opinion.”). 
126 Wolfgang Rüdig & Georgios Karyotis, Who Protests in Greece? Mass 
Opposition to Austerity, 44 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 487, 487 (2014). 
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affected the current situation of the EU.  
 
IV. CRISIS AND RESPONSES TO CRISIS  
 
 Over the last decade, the EU has faced a cascade of 
new crises, from the global financial crisis through the 
European sovereign debt crisis to a refugee crisis. The global 
financial crisis began in the US, rather than in the EU, and 
infected financial institutions and markets and ordinary 
people around the globe. The crisis stressed EU financial 
institutions and led member states to bail out these financial 
institutions, which, in turn, strained public finances.127 
Because EU capital adequacy rules did not force banks to 
distinguish between risky and less risky sovereign debt, EU 
banks continued to invest in riskier, and more profitable 
sovereign debt. This led to a serious problem of mutual 
dependence between banks and sovereigns, which some 
commentators described as a vicious circle.128 This mutual 
dependence problem was particularly acute in the 
                                                
	
	
127 See, e.g., Nicholas Dorn, Regulatory Sloth and Activism in the 
Effervescence of Financial Crisis, 33 L. & POL’Y 428, 428 (2011) (“In 2010 it 
became clear that sovereign states, which had “bailed out” the banking 
sector, were themselves becoming targets of a mixture of speculation and 
genuine fears and uncertainties over their financial health.”). 
128 See, e.g., Ashoka Mody & Damiano Sandri, The Eurozone Crisis: How 
Banks and Sovereigns Came to be Joined at the Hip, 27 ECON. POL’Y 199 
(2012); DAVID HOWARTH & LUCIA QUAGLIA, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
EUROPEAN BANKING UNION (2016). 
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Eurozone,129 and the developing crisis in the Eurozone 
demonstrated weaknesses in governance.130 The problems in 
the Eurozone were especially significant as the idea of 
Economic and Monetary Union was so central to the idea of 
the ever-closer union.131 The EU’s response to the financial 
crises involved an acceleration and intensification of 
                                                
	
	
129 Mark Hallerberg, Fiscal Federalism Reforms in the European Union and 
the Greek Crisis, 12 EUR. UNION POL. 127, 128 (2011) (“The sovereign debt 
crisis in Greece in the spring of 2010 and, to a much lesser extent, in 
Ireland, Spain and Portugal seemed to change everything. It put 
significant pressure on the euro and on the governance structures of the 
euro zone. It also made clear the degree to which all countries in the euro 
zone are connected to one another. Budget decisions in one of the 
smallest economies in the euro zone had implications for all countries 
that have the euro.”). 
130 See, e.g., OECD, ECONOMIC SURVEYS: GREECE 11 (OECD, 2011) (“The dire 
economic situation was magnified by lost credibility as serious 
deficiencies in statistical monitoring of government accounts were 
exposed.”); Manos Matsaganis, The Welfare State and the Crisis: The Case of 
Greece, 21 J. EUR. SOC. POL. 501, 501 (2011)(“The revised figures stunned 
public opinion at home and shocked markets abroad.”); Cf. Jones, 
Kelemen & Meunier, supra note 88; Luc Eyraud, Vitor Gaspar & Tigran 
Poghosyan, Fiscal Politics in the Euro Area, (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working 
Paper WP/17/18, 2017). 
131 See Nicole Scicluna, When Failure Isn’t Failure: European Union 
Constitutionalism After the Lisbon Treaty, 50 J. COMMON. MKT. STUD. 441, 
452 (2012) (“[T]he very projects that were meant to unite European 
citizens and promote their common identity, such as the euro, are now 
straining transnational solidarity and producing a rise in nationalist and 
protectionist sentiments.”). 
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harmonization. For example, before the financial crisis, 
financial regulation was carried out by domestic regulators 
applying harmonized rules of financial regulation.132 After 
the crisis began, the EU agreed to make the European 
Securities Market Authority (“ESMA”) responsible for 
regulating credit ratings under a new EU regulation,133 and 
controlling short selling.134 To address the financial trilemma 
affecting the Eurozone,135 the EU established a European 
Banking Union for the Eurozone in November 2014, 
introducing a system of centralized supervision of banks 
(but not of securities, insurance and pensions markets) for a 
subset of EU Member States.136 The crises created changes in 
                                                
	
	
132 See, e.g., Niamh Moloney, EU Financial Market Regulation after the 
Global Financial Crisis: More Europe or More Risks, 47 COMMON MKT. L. 
REV. 1317, 1319 (2010) (noting the pre-crisis “mis-match between the pan-
EU operations of some major banking groups and nationally-based 
supervision and resolution regimes.”). 
133 See Fabian Amtenbrink & Jakob de Haan, Regulating Credit Ratings in 
the European Union: A Critical First Assessment of Regulation 1060/2009 on 
Credit Rating Agencies, 46 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1915, 1923 (2009). 
134 See, e.g., Valia Babis, The Power to Ban Short-selling and Financial 
Stability: the Beginning of a New Era for EU Agencies?, 73 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 
266 (2014). 
135 Dirk Schoenmaker, The Financial Trilemma, 111 ECON. LETTERS 57 
(2011). 
136 See, e.g., David Howarth & Lucia Quaglia., Banking Union as Holy 
Grail: Rebuilding the Single Market in Financial Services, Stabilizing Europe’s 
Banks and ‘Completing’ Economic and Monetary Union, 51(S1) J. COMMON 
MKT. STUD. 103 (2013). 
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legal institutions and arrangements that would not 
otherwise have occurred.137 The move towards centralization 
of financial regulation proceeded beyond banking with a 
proposal to establish an EU Capital Markets Union.138 This 
proposal was not driven by the same urgent need to control 
risks as the Banking Union, but economic conditions seemed 
to present an opportunity to make new progress on ideas 
that had been around for some time.139 The Capital Markets 
Action plan was related to the crises, as European bank 
weaknesses limited lending, which made the development 
of more effective EU capital markets a policy priority.140 
                                                
	
	
137 See Arjen Boin, Madalina Busuioc & Martijn Groenleer, Building 
European Union Capacity to Manage Transboundary Crises: Network or Lead-
agency Model?, 8 REG. & GOVERNANCE 418, 419 (2014) (“Over the past two 
decades, the European Union (EU) has developed an array of crisis 
management mechanisms that facilitate transboundary coordination and 
cooperation. We might say that the EU has become a “policy laboratory” 
for transboundary crisis management.”). 
138 See EU Commission, Building a Capital Markets Union, COM (2015) 63 
final (Feb. 18, 2015); EU Commission Communication, Action Plan on 
Building a Capital Markets Union, COM (2015) 468 final (Sept. 30, 2015). 
139 See, e.g., Building a Capital Markets Union, supra note 138, at 2 (“It is 
true that many of the issues at stake–insolvency and securities laws, tax 
treatments–have been discussed for many years. The need to make 
progress is, however, more pressing than ever. While this will be a long-
term project, requiring sustained effort over many years, that should not 
stop us making early progress.”). 
140 See Action Plan on Building a Capital Markets Union, supra note 138, 
at 3 (“[I]ntegrated financial and capital markets can help Member States, 
especially those inside the euro area, share the impact of shocks. By 
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Unlike the Banking Union, the idea of the Capital Markets 
Union is to encourage, rather than to control, financial 
activity.141 If the Capital Markets Union project was 
designed to reassure the UK that the EU was pro-market in 
order to encourage the UK to feel better about EU 
membership,142 it failed to persuade UK citizens. The UK’s 
Brexit vote in June 2016 threatens to undermine the 
achievement of the Capital Markets Union as the UK is the 
EU Member State with the most active capital markets143 and 
the dominant capital markets regulator.144 The Commission 
																																								 																																							 																																							 															
	
	
opening up a wider range of funding sources, it will help to share 
financial risks and mean that EU citizens and companies are less 
vulnerable to banking contractions. Furthermore, more developed equity 
markets, as opposed to increased indebtedness, allow for more 
investment over the long term.”). 
141 See, e.g., Nicholas Dorn, Capital Cohabitation: EU Capital Markets Union 
as Public and Private Co-Regulation, 11 CAP. MKT L. J. 84 (2016). 
142 Id. at 90. 
143 See THE CITY UK, KEY FACTS ABOUT THE UK AS AN INTERNATIONAL 
FINANCIAL CENTRE, (2016) (“A high proportion of EU financial market 
activity is concentrated in London and other cities in the UK, especially 
in wholesale markets such as foreign exchange and OTC derivatives 
trading and specialist markets such as hedge fund and marine insurance. 
More than half of European investment banking activity is conducted in 
the UK.”). 
144 See, e.g., Reza Moghadam, How a Post-Brexit Redesign Can Save the 
Capital Markets Union, FINANCIAL TIMES (Feb. 13, 2017) (“[A] regulatory 
splintering is also on the cards — with adverse implications for 
consistency and efficiency.”), www.ft.com/content/6682da18-efb0-11e6-
ba01-119a44939bb6; Cf. André Sapir, Dirk Schoenmaker & Nicolas 
2017 EUROPEAN (DIS)UNION 45 
encouraged the Member States to move forward with the 
Capital Markets Union through a Communication published 
in September 2016, a year after the Action Plan,145 and 
thereafter, a new Consultation on Capital Markets Union in 
January 2017,146 as a component of the Mid-term Review of 
the Capital Markets Union proposal.147 During 2017, the 
Commission published a White Paper and a number of 
reflection papers148 on the future of the EU, including one on 
the future of Economic and Monetary Union, which 
describes progress on the Capital Markets Union as 
“paramount.”149 The IMF agrees that completing the Capital 
Markets Union is important.150 
 In 2017, the financial crises no longer seemed the most 
urgent crises facing the EU, despite new worries about 
																																								 																																							 																																							 															
	
	
Véron, Making the Best of Brexit for the EU27 Financial System, 1 Bruegel 
Pol’y Brief (Feb. 2017). 
145 EU Commission Communication, Capital Markets Union - Accelerating 
Reform, at 2, COM (2016) 601 final (Sep. 14, 2016). 
146 EU Commission, Consultation Document on Capital Markets Union 
Mid-Term Review 2017 (Jan. 20, 2017)  
147 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of 
the Regions on the Mid-Term Review of the Capital Markets Union Action 
Plan, COM (2017) 292 final (June 8, 2017). 
148 See Commission White Paper on the Future of Europe and the Way Forward, 
COM (2017) 2025 (Mar. 1, 2017).  
149 EU Commission, Reflection Paper on the Deepening of the Economic and 
Monetary Union, at 20, COM (2017) 291 final (May 31, 2017).  
150 IMF, supra note 8, at 33. 
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Italian banks151 and continuing concerns about Greece.152 
During 2015, more than a million people – refugees, 
displaced persons, and other migrants – made their way to 
the EU.153 In May 2015 the EU Commission developed a 
European Agenda on Migration, which stated:  
 
We need to restore confidence in our ability to 
bring together European and national efforts to 
address migration, to meet our international 
and ethical obligations and to work together in 
an effective way, in accordance with the 
principles of solidarity and shared 
responsibility. No Member State can effectively 
address migration alone. It is clear that we 
need a new, more European approach. This 
requires using all policies and tools at our 
disposal –combining internal and external 
policies to best effect. All actors: Member 
States, EU institutions, International 
                                                
	
	
151 Andreas (Andy) Jobst & Anke Weber, Profitability and Balance Sheet 
Repair of Italian Banks, (Int’l Monetary Fund, WP/ 16/175, 2016).  
152 See IMF, 2016 Article IV Consultation—Press Release; Staff Report; and 
Statement by the Executive Director for Greece, Country Report No. 17/40 
(Feb. 2017). 
153 See generally Phillip Connor, Number of Refugees to Europe Surges to 
Record 1.3 Million in 2015, PEW RES. CTR (Aug. 2, 2016), 
www.pewglobal.org/2016/08/02/number-of-refugees-to-europe-
surges-to-record-1-3-million-in-2015/. 
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Organisations, civil society, local authorities 
and third countries need to work together to 
make a common European migration policy a 
reality.154  
 
The EU entered into an agreement with Turkey whereby 
Turkey would act to prevent migrants from moving to 
Greece, and to address the problem of migrants dying in 
transit.155 The agreement did succeed in limiting migration 
into the EU from the Middle East.156 However, the 
agreement also compromised the EU’s ability to criticize 
Turkey for its own violations of the rule of law. The EU 
found financing to support the identification of migrants 
who did reach Greece,157 and for food and shelter.158 
Nevertheless, some Member States were more willing than 
others to accept some of the migrants who succeeded in 
getting to Greece. In July 2016 the Commission proposed an 
                                                
	
	
154 EU Commission Communication, A European Agenda on Migration, COM 
(2015) 240 final (May 13, 2015). 
155 Cf., Mediterranean Migrant Arrivals Reach 12,381; Deaths: 272, INT’L ORG. 
FOR MIGRATION (Feb. 17, 2017), www.iom.int/news/mediterranean-
migrant-arrivals-reach-12381-deaths-272. 
156 See FRONTEX, ANNUAL RISK ANALYSIS 2017, 6 (2017). 
157 See, e.g., EU Commission, Daily News MEX/16/70, Commission 
Provides Additional Support for Fingerprinting of Migrants in Greece 
(Jan. 13, 2016). 
158 See, e.g., EU Commission, Press Release IP/16/1447, EU Provides €83 
Million to Improve Conditions for Refugees in Greece (Apr. 19, 2016). 
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EU Resettlement Framework to establish a common 
European policy on resettlement to ensure orderly and safe 
pathways to Europe for persons in need of international 
protection.159 The proposal made an appeal to an idea of 
solidarity among Member States, aiming to share 
responsibility for protection of refugees among EU Member 
States fairly, so that the burden of protecting refugees did 
not fall on States at the edges of the EU.160 These States had 
already suffered more than northern EU Member States 
from the financial crises.161 Newspapers reported stories of 
Germans opening up their homes to migrants.162 However, 
                                                
	
	
159 EU Commission, Proposal for a Regulation Establishing a Union 
Resettlement Framework, COM (2016) 468 final (Jul. 13, 2016). 
160 Id. at 3 (“[T]he proposal aims to: provide a common approach to safe 
and legal arrival in the Union for third-country nationals in need of 
international protection, thus also protecting them from exploitation by 
migrant smuggling networks and endangering their lives in trying the 
reach Europe; help reduce the pressure of spontaneous arrivals on the 
Member States’ asylum systems; enable the sharing of the protection 
responsibility with countries to which or within which a large number of 
persons in need of international protection has been displaced and help 
alleviate the pressure on those countries; provide a common Union 
contribution to global resettlement efforts.”). 
161 See Lillian M. Langford, The Other Euro Crisis: Rights Violations Under 
the Common European Asylum System and the Unraveling of EU Solidarity, 
26 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 217, 217 (2013). 
162 See, e.g., Luke Harding, Philip Oltermann & Nicholas Watt, Refugees 
Welcome? How UK and Germany Compare on Migration, THE GUARDIAN 
(Sep. 2, 2015), www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/02/refugees-
welcome-uk-germany-compare-migration (“Thousands of ordinary 
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official data on relocations of refugees show that progress is 
slow .163 Additionally, the issue of migration and the need 
for the protection of refugees have collided with concerns 
about security after terrorist attacks in European cities.164 
Whether or not the EU has dealt effectively with its financial 
crises, the EU had powers with respect to the single market 
and the Eurozone, and there was some level of common 
agreement among members of the EU that something 
																																								 																																							 																																							 															
	
	
Germans have volunteered to help the refugees now arriving daily. 
Some have filled up their cars with shopping, and distributed clothes, 
nappies, food and cuddly bears. Others have offered German lessons, 
translation and babysitting.”).  
163 See, e.g., EU Commission Communication, Ninth Report on Relocation and 
Resettlement, at 3, COM (2017) 74 final (Feb. 8, 2017) (“After the adoption 
of the 8th Report, the Commission called bilaterally on almost all 
Member States to increase their efforts to meet the targets. Already active 
Member States and Associated Countries reacted positively and 
communicated to the Commission their planning for monthly pledges. 
However, the picture is disappointing with certain other Member States. 
Hungary, Austria and Poland remain the only Member States that have 
not relocated anyone. Slovakia continues relocating on a very limited 
basis and the Czech Republic has not pledged since May 2016 and has 
not relocated anyone since August 2016.”).  
164 See, e.g., Proposal for a Directive on Combating Terrorism, at 3, COM 
(2015) 625 final (Dec. 2, 2015) (“The existing rules need to be aligned 
taking into account the changing terrorist threat Europe is facing. This 
includes adequate criminal law provisions addressing the foreign 
terrorist fighter phenomenon and risks related to the travel to third 
countries to engage in terrorist activities but also the increased threats 
from perpetrators who remain within Europe.”). 
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needed to be done. Although critics challenged some of the 
EU’s responses to the financial crises as going beyond its 
powers,165 or as misguidedly using intergovernmental 
methods rather than Community methods, the EU did act to 
calm the financial crises. But the EU’s acceptance of austerity 
as a response to the crisis arguably intensified citizen 
discomfort with the EU as a project that favoured elites.166 In 
addition, the refugee crisis helped nourish a wave of 
populism in the EU that seems to have affected the UK 
Brexit vote and to be affecting elections in other EU Member 
States.167 
                                                
	
	
165 See Claes & Reestman, supra note 86; see also Babis, supra note 134. 
166 See, e.g., Sarah B. Hobolt, The Brexit Vote: A Divided Nation, a Divided 
Continent, 23 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 1259, 1260 (2016) (“many voters across 
Europe see the EU as part of the problem rather than the solution when 
it comes to protecting ordinary citizens from the challenges of an ever 
more globalized and integrated world.”); And see also e.g. id. at 1263-4 
(“the Leave side successfully mobilized not only salient concerns about 
immigration but also anti-establishment attitudes, portraying the vote as 
a chance for ordinary citizens to ‘take back control’ from the élites in 
Brussels.”). 
167 Opposition to immigration was one of the major motivators of votes 
to leave the EU. See, e.g., id. at 1263 (“the two key arguments that 
resonate more with Remain voters than with Leave voters relate to the 
economy, specifically the loss of economic stability in the event of Brexit 
and the economic benefits of EU membership, while Leave voters 
highlight mainly concerns about immigration as expressed by one 
respondent: ‘Immigrants flooding into the country if we don’t regain 
control of our own borders.’”); cf. Cigdem Kentmen-Cin & Cengiz Erisen, 
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 The next section of this paper looks at the current 
tension in the EU and beyond between technocratic, 
evidence-based policy-making and democratic governance. 
 
V. TECHNOCRATIC VS POLITICAL GOVERNANCE  
 
 Although the European Economic Community 
always had a Parliament, the Parliament originally had 
limited powers and was not directly elected by citizens.168 
The Parliament’s powers increased over time, but the 
intergovernmental aspects of the EU remain significant.169 
Although European citizens elect Members of the European 
Parliament, voter turnout for these elections tends to be 
low.170 Many commentators have critiqued the democratic 
																																								 																																							 																																							 															
	
	
Anti-immigration Attitudes and the Opposition to European Integration: A 
Critical Assessment, 18 EUR. UNION POL. 3 (2017). 
168 See Eric Stein, The European Parliamentary Assembly: Techniques of 
Emerging “Political Control,” 13 INT’L ORG. 233, 233 (1959) (“[T]he 
European Parliamentary Assembly is far from being a parliament.”). 
169 See, e.g., Sergio Fabbrini, Intergovernmentalism in the European Union:. A 
Comparative Federalism Perspective, 24 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 580, 581 (2017) 
(“In the new policies, the Commission has come to play an implementing 
rather than decision-making role, whereas the EP has been downsized in 
its influence and power.”). 
170 Results of the 2014 European Elections: Turnout, European Parliament, 
www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/turnout.html, (last 
visited Apr. 13, 2017). 
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deficit in Europe,171 and others have argued for thinking 
about justifying Europe on the basis of output legitimacy.172 
They argued that the legitimacy of the EU could be assessed 
based on what it did, as much as on how it did what it 
did.173 Assessing what the EU has done is a complex and 
highly technical exercise, and involves experts rather than 
citizens. Citizens with higher levels of education are more 
likely to be receptive to arguments based on expertise and it 
is not surprising that more highly educated citizens have 
more positive views of the EU than less educated citizens.174  
 However, failures of technocratic policy-making 
worry even those who may be inclined to accept technocratic 
                                                
	
	
171 See Joseph H.H. Weiler, Ulrich Haltern & Franz Mayer, European 
Democracy and its Critique: Five Uneasy Pieces (European Univ. Inst. Robert 
Schuman Ctr., EUI Working Paper RSC No. 95/11, 1995). Cf. Henig, 
supra note 53, at 130 (“However, it is legitimacy and not democracy 
which is the critical operating condition for integration. It follows that at 
least part of the debate over the future role of the European Parliament 
has been in a false context. Even on the assumption that the granting of 
more powers to that body is equivalent to making the Community more 
democratic, the act of doing this may contribute little towards making 
the institutions legitimate.”). 
172 See, e.g., Andrew Moravcsik, In Defence of the “Democratic Deficit”: 
Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union, 40 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 
603 (2002). 
173 Cf. Andreas Follesdal & Simon Hix, Why There Is a Democratic Deficit in 
the EU: A Response to Majone and Moravcsik, 44 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 533 
(2006). 
174 See Hobolt, supra note 166, at 1265. 
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justifications for policy decisions. The financial crisis and the 
EU’s response to it, raises issues about the effectiveness of 
policy-making in the EU and in other parts of the world, 
especially with respect to financial regulation. The pre-
financial crisis paradigm of financial regulation was one in 
which technocratic regulators acknowledged and deferred to 
the expertise of market actors to identify and control risk.175 
But, investigations of the financial crisis found deregulation 
and excessive faith in mathematical models were important 
causes of the crisis.176 This was not just an issue for the EU. 
Domestic policy-makers within Member States and 
elsewhere adopted the deregulatory and risk-management 
paradigm of financial regulation that helped to generate the 
crisis, and EU institutions also participated in these 
developments. Since the financial crisis, there are reasons to 
continue to doubt whether financial regulation in the EU 
and elsewhere is as effective as it needs to be. For example, 
financial institutions have been targets of enforcement 
                                                
	
	
175 See Caroline Bradley, Changing Perceptions of Systemic Risk in Financial 
Regulation, in AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: SHIFTING LEGAL, ECONOMIC 
AND POLITICAL PARADIGMS (Pablo Iglesias-Rodriguez, Anna 
Triandafyllidou, & Ruby Gropas, 2016). 
176 See Brooksley Born, Forward: Deregulation: A Major Cause of the 
Financial Crisis, 5 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 231 (2011); see also Ross Levine, 
The Governance of Financial Regulation: Reform Lessons from the Recent 
Crisis, 12 INT’L REV. FIN. 39 (2012); FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, THE 
TURNER REVIEW: A REGULATORY RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL BANKING 
CRISIS, 22 (Mar. 2009). 
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actions relating to manipulation of benchmarks and failures 
of compliance.177 Meanwhile, the EU’s Capital Markets 
Union proposal, which emphasized the need to break down 
barriers, both in national law and in the EU’s prospectus 
rules,178 demonstrated an openness to the idea that financial 
regulation should not impede the financing of business. The 
Commission argues the EU Capital Markets Union is 
important because of ongoing weaknesses in EU banking 
markets since the financial crisis.179 In most EU Member 
States, banking has been more important as a source of 
funding for business activity than capital markets.180 The 
                                                
	
	
177 See In re Deutsche Bank AG, N.Y Dept. Fin. Serv., Consent Order Under 
New York Banking Law §§ 39, 44 and 44-a (“[T]his Consent Order 
addresses serious compliance deficiencies identified in the Department’s 
investigation that spanned Deutsche Bank’s global enterprise. These 
flaws allowed a corrupt group of bank traders and offshore entities to 
improperly and covertly transfer more than $10 billion out of Russia, by 
conscripting Deutsche Bank operations in Moscow, London and New 
York to their improper purpose.”).  
178 EU Commission Communication, Action Plan on Building a Capital 
Markets Union, COM (2015) 468 final (Sep. 30, 2015). 
179 See, e.g., EU Commission, Consultation Document: Capital Markets Union 
Mid-Term Review 2017 at 4 (Jan. 2017) (“The EU economy needs bigger 
and better capital markets to help break its reliance on bank lending and 
diversify its sources of funding.”) [hereinafter Capital Markets Union 
Mid-Term Review 2017]. 
180 See IMF, European Union: Financial Sector Assessment Program-- 
Technical Note on European Securities and Markets Authority, Country 
Report No. 13/69, at 6 (Mar. 2013) (“The EU financial systems are mostly 
bank-based.”); Id. at 4 (“Europe has a shortage of risk capital for small, 
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UK, which now plans to leave the EU, is a major 
exception.181 Although the Capital Markets Union 
documents suggest a need to balance facilitation of markets 
with regulation,182 there are reasons to be concerned that EU 
policy-makers may focus more on encouraging the EU 
capital markets to develop than on ensuring the necessary 
level of regulation of those markets.183  
 If the crisis itself led citizens to be skeptical of the EU 
as an effective policy-making entity, the EU’s response to the 
financial crisis did not help. The EU’s response to the crisis 
increased the EU’s democratic deficit.184 Moreover, austerity, 
																																								 																																							 																																							 															
	
	
early-stage growing businesses. This is holding back the development of 
high-growth sectors such as technology which are essential for economic 
competitiveness. While sources of capital such as crowdfunding and 
business angels are becoming more accessible, the EU is still at a 
significant disadvantage to the United States.”). 
181 See, e.g., William Wright, Julio Suarez, Paul McGhee & Laurence Bax, 
The Benefits of Capital Markets to High-potential EU Economies, at 6, AFME, 
(Nov. 2016), www.afme.eu/en/reports/publications/the-benefits-of-
capital-markets-to-high-potential-eu-economies. 
182 Capital Markets Union Mid-Term Review 2017, supra note 179, at 14 
(“There is a need to ensure that the regulatory framework strikes an 
appropriate balance between enabling the development of FinTech on a 
pan-EU basis and ensuring confidence for investors.”). 
183 Cf. AFME, THE SHORTAGE OF RISK CAPITAL FOR EUROPE’S HIGH 
GROWTH BUSINESSES 4-5 (Mar. 2017). 
184 See Giandomenico Majone, From Regulatory State to a Democratic 
Default, 52 J COMMON MKT. STUD. 1216, 1216 (2014). 
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imposed on countries like Greece,185 or adopted voluntarily 
as in the UK,186 burdened the more vulnerable members of 
European societies.187 Such circumstances can lead citizens 
to become politically engaged in new ways,188 or to see 
                                                
	
	
185 See Sofia Vasilopoulou, Daphne Halikiopoulou &Theofanis 
Exadaktylos, Greece in Crisis: Austerity, Populism and the Politics of Blame, 
52 J COMMON MKT. STUD 388, 388 (2014).  
186 See HM Treasury, Budget 2010, HC 61 (Jun. 22, 2010) at 1 (“The most 
urgent task facing this country is to implement an accelerated plan to 
reduce the deficit. Reducing the deficit is a necessary precondition for 
sustained economic growth. To continue with the existing fiscal plans 
would put the recovery at risk, given the scale of the challenge. High 
levels of debt also put an unfair burden on future generations.”); Michael 
Kitson, Ron Martin & Peter Tyler, The Geographies of Austerity, 4 CAMB. J. 
REGIONS, ECON. & SOC. 289, 294 (2011) (“In the UK, ‘the Conservative-
Liberal Democrat coalition government announced the biggest cuts in 
state spending since World War II. Savings estimated at about £83bn are 
to be made over four years. The plan is to cut 490,000 public sector jobs. 
Most Whitehall departments face budget cuts of 19% on average.’”) Cf. 
Dawn Holland & Jonathan Portes, Self-Defeating Austerity?, 222 NAT’L 
INST. ECON. REV. F4, F4 (2012). 
187 See Ulrich Beck, Why ‘Class’ Is Too Soft a Category to Capture the 
Explosiveness of Social Inequality at the Beginning of the Twenty-first Century, 
64 BRIT. J. SOC. 63, 68 (2013) (“The risks posed by big banks are being 
socialized by the state and imposed on retirees through austerity 
dictates.”). 
188 Cf. McDonald, supra note 49, at 54 (“[T]he economic models that 
informed the market, and the political science models that have 
informed moments of institutional optimism, have not been models in 
which people have figured other than as ciphers embodying an ideal 
rationality that the model-makers themselves construct. Real post-1970s 
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political issues in other ways.189 This does not mean that 
citizens will become interested in the technical details of 
complex policy areas such as financial regulation, although 
some commentators argue that the defects of technocratic 
policy-making require more democratic input.190 But 
whether or not citizens get involved in technical policy 
details, when they are invited to express their views in 
elections or referenda their actions raise questions about the 
future of the European project. Brexit is one obvious 
example of this sort of development. 
 The current tension between populist politics, which 
tends to discount complex thinking and to be suspicious of 
detailed evidence, and the technocratic policy-making 
processes characteristic of the neoliberal economic order is 
apparent in the UK, but also in the US.191 During the 
campaign leading up to the Brexit referendum, Michael 
Gove, then the UK’s Justice Secretary, said that “people in 
																																								 																																							 																																							 															
	
	
people have burst onto the scene in elections and referenda, however, 
sending EC officials diving for cover until their optimism could be re-
stoked.”). 
189 See Alexia Katsanidou & Simon Otjes, How the European Debt Crisis 
Reshaped National Political Space: The Case of Greece, 17 EUR. UNION POL. 
279-81 (2016). 
190 See, e.g., Marija Bartl, Contesting Austerity: On the Limits of EU 
Knowledge Governance, 44 J L. & SOC’Y. 150, 150 (2017). 
191 See, e.g., Nye, supra note 18, at 14-15.  
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this country have had enough of experts.”192 And, since the 
Brexit referendum, increasing evidence that it will be 
difficult for the UK to negotiate terms for Brexit that would 
give the UK Leave voters what they seem to have wanted,193 
does not seem to have diminished the calls for Brexit,194 
although by the late summer of 2017 some politicians and 
commentators focused on the idea of a lengthy transition 
                                                
	
	
192 See, e.g., Henry Mance, Britain Has Had Enough of Experts, Says Gove, 
FINANCIAL TIMES (June 3, 2016), www.ft.com/content/3be49734-29cb-
11e6-83e4-abc22d5d108c; Fraswer Nelson, Michael Gover Was 
(Accidentally) Right about Experts, THE SPECTATOR (Jan 14, 2017), 
https://www.spectator.co.uk/2017/01/michael-gove-was-accidentally-
right-about-experts/#.  
193 See, e.g., Chris Giles, Brexit Will Damage UK Standards of Living, Say 
Economists, FINANCIAL TIMES (Apr. 16, 2017), 
www.ft.com/content/dc62922a-204b-11e7-a454-ab04428977f9; Monica 
Langella & Alan Manning, Who Voted Leave?, CentrePiece Autumn 
2016 at http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/cp479.pdf; Aditya Aney, 
Alberto Gallo, Pablo Morenes & Tao Pan, Brexit Could Be the Best Thing 
That Happened to the European Union, (Apr. 12, 2017), 
weforum.org/agenda/2017/04/brexit-european-union-negotiations. 
194 Theresa May, the UK Prime Minister, has been determined that Brexit 
means Brexit, and notified the EU of the UK’s intention to leave the EU 
in March 2017. See Prime Minister’s Letter to Donald Tusk Triggering Article 
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period to mitigate the harms of Brexit.195 
 However, the UK is not the only place where voters 
who feel that the global economy has been managed in ways 
that disadvantage them have turned to politicians who claim 
to oppose existing arrangements for international trade. In 
France, presidential candidate Marine Le Pen (who lost to 
Emmanuel Macron)196 argued that France should leave the 
Eurozone.197 Supporters of free trade have attempted to 
respond with arguments that the problem is not the fact of 
free trade, but rather, how politicians respond to the effects 
of free trade.198 The European Union has attempted to 
navigate for many years this balance between free trade and 
protecting citizens as workers and consumers and 
beneficiaries of fundamental rights. But the financial crisis, 
the response to the crisis and the refugee crisis combined to 
produce stresses that the EU institutions had difficulty 
addressing effectively. 
                                                
	
	
195 See, e.g., Leonid Bershidsky, Brexit Is Beginning to Look Like No Brexit, 
BLOOMBERG VIEW (Aug. 28, 2017), bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-
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French Assembly Election, FINANCIAL TIMES (Jun. 19, 2017), 
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 The EU Commission commemorated the 60th 
anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Rome by 
publishing a White Paper on the Future of Europe.199 The 
White Paper began by quoting Robert Schumann’s idea that 
“`Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a 
single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements 
which first create a de facto solidarity.” 200 Recent 
developments raise questions about the state of European 
solidarity. The UK’s Brexit vote is a new example of what 
has been a recurrent feature of the UK’s relationship with 
the rest of Europe over the last 60 years.201 Nevertheless, 
questions about the relationship between the Member States 
and the EU have also been raised in elections in other 
Member States, even in France, one of the original six 
Member States. These questions are part of a broader 
willingness to challenge neoliberalism202  
 Many factors have contributed to the EU’s current 
                                                
	
	
199 White Paper on the Future of Europe, supra note 148. 
200 Id. at 4; see also Schuman supra note 30. 
201 Cf. Daddow, supra note 17, at 214 (“Europe has always been 
constructed and perceived as a ‘choice’ for the British who can 
apparently be ‘in’ or ‘out’ of Europe and more often than not ‘semi-
detached’ from it. These tensions indicate Britain’s unresolved identity as 
a truly European nation”). 
202 See, e.g., Nye, supra note 18. 
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existential crisis, but the crisis raises a fundamental question: 
what good is transnational governance if it cannot protect 
citizens from the transmission of risks across borders, 
whether those risks are financial, related to climate change, 
disease, or produced by conflict in other parts of the world. 
And this question raises a further set of questions about 
what institutional arrangements for multilevel governance 
or quasi-federal structures might be sufficiently resilient to 
adapt to the sorts of changing circumstances and crises that 
the world is likely to face in the near future. It is too early to 
know whether the EU’s governance structures are 
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